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ABSTRACT
THE PLACE OF SOCIAL IDENTITY IN TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA IN THE LIGHT OF LIBERAL AND
CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES
Kılınç, Ramazan
Master, Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer
September 2001
This thesis aims to describe the positions of diverse social identities in Turkey
concerning Turkey’s foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era. This exercise will
be placed within the framework of the theoretical propositions of liberal and
constructivist International Relations (IR) theories with special references to their
emphases on the role of identity on foreign policy making in a comparative manner. For
liberal theoreticians, key concept is “state preferences” in the formation of foreign
policy. They argue that state preferences are formed in the process of the competition of
views among social identities in the society as well as by the constraints resulting from
the preferences of other states. In the constructivist theory, a key concept is “national
interests” which are constructed and negotiated socially by the discourses among
different national identities. In this context, it will be examined the impact of diverse
social identities, namely, Kemalist, liberal, nationalist, Kurdish and Islamic identities on
the Turkey’s foreign policies towards Europe and Eurasia.
Keywords: Identity, Turkish Foreign Policy, Liberal International Relations Theory,
Constuctivist International Relations Theory
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ÖZET
LİBERAL VE KONSTRÜKTİVİST YAKLAŞIMLARIN IŞIĞINDA SOĞUK SAVAŞ
SONRASI TÜRKİYE’NİN DIŞ POLİTİKA SEÇENEKLERİNDE SOSYAL KİMLİĞİN YERİ
Kılınç, Ramazan
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer
Eylül 2001
Bu tez, soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye’de çeşitli sosyal kimliklerin Türkiye’nin
dış politika seçeneklerinin oluşumundaki yerlerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu uğraş
içerisinde liberal ve konstrüktivist uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin, özellikle kimliğin dış
politika yapımındaki rolünü vurgulayan teorik çerçevelerinden karşılaştırmalı olarak
yararlanılacaktır. Liberal teorisyenlere göre dış politika yapımındaki anahtar kavram
“devlet tercihleri”dir. Onlar, devlet tercihlerinin toplumdaki farklı sosyal kimliklerin
görüşlerinin rekabeti sürecinde ve diğer devletlerin tercihlerinden kaynaklanan
sınırlamalarla oluşturulduğunu iddia ederler. Konstrüktivist teoride anahtar kavram
farklı kimlikler arasındaki söylemlerin bir neticesi olarak inşa edilen “ulusal çıkarlar”
dır. Bu çerçevede, başlıca, Kemalist, liberal, milliyetçi, Kürt ve İslamcı olmak üzere
çeşitli sosyal kimliklerin, Türkiye’nin Avrupa ve Avrasya’ya yönelik dış politikalarının
oluşumuna olan etkileri üzerinde durulacaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik, Türk Dış Politikası, Liberal Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi,
Konstrüktivist Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi.
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1INTRODUCTION
This thesis aims to describe the positions of diverse social identities in Turkey
concerning Turkey’s foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era. This exercise
will be placed within the framework of the theoretical propositions of liberal and
constructivist International Relations (IR) theories with special references to their
emphases on the role of identity on foreign policy making in a comparative manner.
For liberal theoreticians, key concept is “state preferences” in the formation of
foreign policy. They argue that state preferences are formed in the process of the
competition of views among social identities in the society as well as by the
constraints resulting from the preferences of other states. In the constructivist theory,
a key concept is “national interests” which are constructed and negotiated socially by
the discourses among different national identities.
Liberal and constructivist theories suggest that national identity encircles the
mindsets of the decision makers by drawing boundaries between “self” and “other.”
The accentuation of these borders emphasizes some characteristics of the identity and
provides some continual patterns in the behaviors of nations. These characteristics
become the elements of continuity in foreign policy making. Since the national
identity is the creation of social interactions through drawing boundaries between
“self” and “other,” it is a dynamic phenomenon that can change over time. The
change of the identities incites the states to produce new patterns of foreign policies
that also change the structural characteristics of the international system.
Accordingly, identity generally prepares the cognitive backgrounds for the
formulation of national interests by determining friend and enemy elements
2according to the ideological priorities of the state and the historical and social
constructions of the state and the society. In this formula, national interest includes
not only the external interests of the state, but the internal priorities also takes an
important place.
The end of the Cold War had diversified the strategic options Turkey had confronted.
During the Cold War, a strategic culture against the enemy of Communism under the
NATO umbrella had been evolved. However, after the end of the Cold War, the
options of United States and Western Europe had been varied as well as of Turkey.
Thus, the patterns of Turkey’s relations with the West in general and with Europe in
particular have changed. On the other side, the demise of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia has opened new opportunities and strategic possibilities for Turkey.
There have been realized traditional and historical affinities between Turkey and the
newly founded states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. As a result, Turkey
has found itself between two fundamental foreign policy options: (i) to accentuate its
centuries-old European orientation by integrating with the European Union, which is
claimed to be the institutional representation of the European identity; (ii) to have a
sphere of influence and to be leader of the newly independent Turkish Republics in
Eurasia.
Within this context, this study consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1, I will try to
describe the theoretical background to explain the impact of identity on foreign
policy. In this respect, I will firstly explore the concept of identity and its role in the
conduct of foreign policy; and expose how identity determines the elements of
continuity and change in foreign policy. Then, I will respectively explore the
3theoretical assumptions of liberal and constructivist IR theories with special
reference to their emphases on identity. And finally I will draw upon the propositions
of these theories; and expected foreign policy behaviors in the analysis of Turkish
foreign policy within the theoretical borders of these theories.
In Chapter 2, I will examine Turkey’s European option with special respect to the
explanations of liberal and constructivist IR theories. In this context, firstly I will
search for the institutional and historical contexts that have been influential in the
construction of Turkey’s European identity. Then, I will review Turkey’s relations
with Europe in the post-Cold War era within the context of differentiating discourses
debate among diverse identities in Turkey toward Turkey’s place in Europe. In so
doing, I will touch upon how Turkey’s preferences and interests towards Europe
have been constructed within the frameworks of liberal and constructivist IR
theories.
In Chapter 3, I will examine the Eurasian option in Turkish foreign policy in the
post-Cold War era. I will begin my analysis by reviewing the Turkish foreign policy
towards Eurasia in the post-Cold war era. Then I will examine the discourses and
debates among different social identities influential in the formation of the state
preferences and construction of national interests in Turkey’s foreign policy towards
Eurasia with special references to the liberal and constructivist IR theories. After
Chapter 3, in the concluding chapter I will draw upon the conclusions of the study.
4CHAPTER 1:
IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY:
LIBERAL AND CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES
In this chapter, I will present the theoretical background to explain the impact of
identity on foreign policy. In this context, I will firstly explore the concept of identity
and its role in the formation of foreign policy. Then I will expose how identity
determines the elements of continuity and change in foreign policy. After the
examination of the role of identity on foreign policy, I will present the theoretical
assumptions of liberal and constructivist IR theories with respect to their approaches
to the role of identity on foreign policy. I will conclude this chapter by the section, in
which it will be explored the way of implementation of these theoretical assumptions
to the Turkish foreign policy analyses in the post-Cold War era.
1. IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
1. 1. Defining Identity: Drawing Borders Between “Self” and “Other”
Identity is a concept, which is constructed in the social and historical contexts by the
creation of the differences between self and other as the outcomes of their
interactions. It influences the individuals or groups who identify them with that
identity. In particular circumstances, identity becomes the instrument for certain
individuals or groups to conceive their similarities to some actors and their
differences from others. Thus, the two pioneering concepts of identity to be explored
5are “self” and “other,” among which a dialectical relation exists. Creation of the
boundaries between self and other also constitutes the process of the construction of
identities. There had been developed some explanations to find answers why people
live in certain identified groups. There are psychological, sociological and
philosophical explanations for the construction of identities.
Firstly, identity psychologically rescues individuals from the instability of the world.
By means of identity, life becomes more predictable. The individuals become
informed “how their behavior will affect others’ behavior toward them” (Fiske and
Taylor, 1991 cited in Chafetz et al., 1998/1999: ix). The mechanism, which provides
the stability within the identity, stems from the accentuation of organic relations
within the group, which facilitate the separation of the borders between in-group and
out-group. The construction of boundaries is the primary stage since “they mark the
difference between inside and outside, strange and familiar, relatives and non-
relatives, friends and enemies, culture and nature, enlightenment and barbarism”
(Giesen, 1998: 13). This causes positive perceptions towards the in-group, and at the
same time negative perceptions towards the out-group.
Secondly, since individuals live in social context, all the identities are constructed by
some social incitements. Individuals identify themselves with others in groups. This
identification within the social context is shaped by “values, norms, beliefs, role
conceptions, attitudes, stereotypes, and other cognitive, affective and motivational
phenomena” (Turner, 1985: 80 cited in Chafetz et al., 1998/1999: x), created through
the social interaction. In the political scene, identifying with a group serves for the
sake of cohesion in the community. Hedley Bull (1977) introduces the concept of the
6“stability of expectations” when he explains the creation of social identities. He
argues (1977: 3-52) that government bureaucracies and society cannot function
without a minimum level of stability of expectations. To provide the minimum level
of stability of expectations, “political communities develop powerful myths and
institutions designed to enhance and defend their roles and to foster citizen
identification with those roles” (Chafetz et al., 1998/1999: xii).
Thirdly, some philosophical approaches have been made to elucidate the construction
of relations between “self” and “other.” In this respect, Simmel (1970) introduces
“strangers” as the basic reason of identity construction. Strangers, as a marginalized
term for the group in question, play an important role in collective identity formation
in the sense that strangers become the determinants of the borders between self and
other (1970: 144 cited in Neumann, 1998: 8). Schmitt (1963), on the other hand,
emphasizes the importance of the “enemy” as providing coherence in the domestic
politics. Accordingly, a state needs to draw differences between itself and its
“enemy.” He claims (1963: 14 quoted in Neumann, 1998: 12) that by means of the
enemy, the political entity entails integration within itself. Nietzsche (1992), contrary
to Simmel and Schmidt’s constructions, dissolve the categories that explain the
formation of self/other relations. He argues that “knowing” the relations as they are
in that way is the reason of them; and stresses (1992: 46 quoted in Neumann, 1998:
12) that the world does not simply present itself to human beings; rather, the activity
of knowing is a formulation of the world.
After examining the motives encouraging the distinction of “self” and “other,” one
should answer to the question of how this distinction results the construction of
7identities. In other words, what are the requirements for the construction of
identities? However, in the examination of this problematic, our consideration will be
the national and state identities that are the basic subjects of the foreign policy
making. Since identity has two dimensions of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ the answer of this
question is twofold: on the one hand, there are certain factors influential in the
accentuation of ‘self;’ and on the other hand ‘otherness’ is the result of certain
differences between the groups. An elaborate explanation of identity construction
requires examining the factors that accentuate ‘self,’ as well as the differences that
create ‘otherness.’
Nations, as social groups, derive a sense of identity due to the aforementioned
reasons. Although national identity is a dynamic phenomenon that can change over
time, it has some stable characteristics that have resistance to change; and give the
self-schema of the identity. There are some factors that form this national self-
schema. Smith points out (1991: 21) six main factors: “a collective proper name, a
myth of a common ancestry, shared historical memories, one of more differentiating
elements of common culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland,’ a sense of
solidarity for significant sectors of the population.”
The internalization of these factors results the construction of identity. However, in
internalization process, one of these factors, which shape the nature of the identity, is
generally more emphasized than the others. For instance, if the nation emphasizes a
myth of a common ancestry, then ethnic nationalism will be basic tenet of national
identity, whereas if the nation emphasizes the homeland, then civic nationalism will
8be the basic tenet of the national identity (Yurdusev, 1997: 26).1 This identity reflects
the historical and cultural backgrounds of the states to adopt certain behaviors.
Although this constructed self-schema provides preconditions to form a national
identity, it is the interaction with other nations that facilitates nations to evolve a
sense of national uniqueness. As in Derrida’s point of view (1992: 9-10) all the
identities exist within their differences from the other ones; and there is no cultural
identity that has not any ‘other’ (cited in Yurdusev, 1997: 20). Yurdusev (1997: 20-
21) depicts that sometimes the role of the ‘other’ in the construction of national
identities is exaggerated by some societies, in which the ‘other’ determined the basic
characteristics of the identity rather than their self-characteristics. He (1997: 20-21)
continues his argumentation over the cases from the history. For instance, Helens
identified themselves with their differences from the Persians. Furthermore he (1997:
20-21) reminds us that the ‘others’ usually gave the names of the national groups.
For example, ‘Turk’ is not a name from the Turkish language, but from the Chinese
language. Thus ‘other’ is as important as ‘self’ in the shaping of national identities.2
                                                
1 Scholars of ethnicity and nationalism generally deduce two main types of national identities: ethnic
and civic nationalisms. In the words of Charles A. Kupchan (1995: 4) “ethnic nationalism defines
nationhood in terms of lineage. The attributes that members of an ethnically defined national grouping
share include physical characteristic, culture, religion, language, and a common ancestry. Individuals
of a different ethnicity, even if they reside in and are citizens of the nation state in question do not
become part of the national grouping.” On the other hand, “Civic nationalism defines nationhood in
terms of citizenship and political participation. Members of a national grouping that is defined in civic
terms share participation in a circumscribed political community, common political values, a sense of
belonging to the state in which they reside, and , usually, a common language.” Thus, “a citizen is a
national, regardless of ethnicity and lineage.”
2 “Identity” is a more complex social phenomenon than is described here. It subsumes elements of
ideology as well. In other words, the borderline between “identity” and “ideology” is not absolutely
clear. The two interact and interpenetrate each other in intimate ways. Take for example the identity of
a Marxist, a capitalist, and a liberal. Each identity is shaped by a heavy dose of ideological value
systems about how society should be organized. One’s definition of the “self” and “other” in these
instances are strongly influenced by one’s ideological view of the world. For purposes of brevity, I
shall merely acknowledge the presence of this “grey area” between identity and ideology and not
discuss it any further.
91. 2. Identity and the Formation of Foreign Policy
The creation of the national identity from the borders drawn between ‘self’ and
‘other’ is crucial for the link between identity and foreign policy making. Here, it is
required to make a distinction between state identity and national identity. State
identity reflects the official considerations of the state about its identity, while
national identity reflects the diverging features of the nation. For instance while
Islam is a part of national identity in Turkey, it is not a part of state identity, which
has been drawn upon by the Kemalist principles. State identity is more influential in
the formation of foreign policy, while diverging parts of national identity has a little
impact on it according to the competition within the country. The way a state
interprets its differences from the others influences its policies towards them. At this
point a question arises: what is the role of the system in the formation of identities,
and consequently in the formation of foreign policies?
Since the states are social actors interacting with the other states, with international
institutions, and also with their public, these interactions create certain patterns of
norms. Both the states and the international systemic dynamics contribute to the
creation of these particular norms. However, since the states are the forerunner and
builders of the institutions, their identities are the most important factor in the
establishment of the system. Furthermore, as system becomes strengthened gradually
by means of norms created by the states, it also gains particular mode of identity,
which impacts the way the states behave. This dynamic model determines the logic
of international relations.
10
What identity adds to the conventional views, which assert that the distribution of
material capabilities are crucial in world politics, is its emphasis to conduct
parameters of how states make rational choices within the burdens of their historical,
cultural, social and political backgrounds. States interpret the material capabilities
and rank their priorities within the borders their identities establish. Identity, in such
a formulation, defines the priorities of the states in question. These priorities put
constraints on foreign as well as domestic decisions of the states.
1. 2. 1. Identity and Elements of Continuity in Foreign Policy
As explored above, national identity encircles the mindsets of the decision makers by
drawing boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other.’ The accentuation of these borders
determines the characteristics of the state identity and provides continual patterns in
the behaviors of states. These characteristics of the identity affect the elements of
continuity in foreign policy. For instance, Turkey’s approach towards Europe since
the nineteenth century brought Western-orientation as a continual element of Turkish
foreign policy.3
Prizel (1998: 24), in analyzing the links between identities and foreign policies of the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and parts of Central and South America,
tries to draw upon the continuities in foreign policies of these countries, stemmed
from their identities. Accordingly, a strong sense of cultural and political
                                                
3 Turkey, by the end of the eighteenth century, began to pretend the European civilization and
Turkey’s struggle to be regarded as European continued in the following decades. This process of
being European accelerated by the Tanzimat era and reached its peak point by the establishment of the
Turkish Republic. Turkey’s Europeanization project included a Western oriented foreign policy by the
end of the Second World War. From the end of the war onwards, Turkey aimed to be included all
European institutions.
11
ressentiment, channeled to the external countries and the identities inherited from the
history play a crucial role in the formation of foreign policy. He argues that the
ressentiment in these countries has produced a feeling of social and political
injustice. They strongly react to the attribution of the Western Europe that sees their
civilizations as peripheral and marginalized within the international system. As a
reaction to this attribution, they construct ‘noble origins’ from the history for
themselves. This brings the emphasis on the cultural processes that create a certain
romanticism embedded to the state identity, and the constraints on the foreign policy
decision making processes.
1. 2. 2. Identity and Elements of Change in Foreign Policy
Since the identity is the creation of social interactions through drawing boundaries
between ‘self’ and ‘other,’ it is a dynamic phenomenon that can change over time.
Complete change of identity is not possible, however, historical process has the
ability to change the state identity gradually. The change of the identities incites
states to produce new patterns of foreign policies that also change the structural
characteristics of the international system. Yet, identities gradually change over time,
however there are some reasons that cause rapid transformations and drastic identity
shifts in a short period of time. At this point a question arises: When identity
transforms into different patterns? It can be deduced five reasons for the identity
shifts of the states.
Firstly, military and diplomatic defeats can bring rapid transformations in state
identities (Prizel, 1998: 34). Since defeats are acknowledgement that there is
12
something wrong with existing system, the public and elite make reconsiderations in
the postwar periods. The disappointment and negative legacies of war weaken the
cohesion of national identity; and impose new patterns of behaviors. At these times
states obtain new perceptions about their role in the international system. Prizel gives
France to exemplify this. Accordingly, as the result of France’s defeats in Indochina
(1954) and Algeria (1962), France has shifted from the self-perception of ‘civilizing
empire’ to one of the components of ‘larger European entity’ (Prizel, 1998: 34).
Secondly, one important element altering the identity of a country is “the
metamorphosis or the total disappearance of the ‘other’” (Prizel: 1998: 33). For
instance, the disintegration of the USSR affected the domestic and foreign policy
priorities of the Central European states. This shift in their domestic and foreign
policies is a natural result of the change of the meaning of ‘Western Europe’ as
‘other’ for them during the Cold War years. Western Europe and modern European
liberal values become covetous models for these countries; contrary to the Cold War
years, when these values were the ‘other’ of them. This led the pursuit of these states
to be the members of NATO and European Union.
Thirdly, the systemic or regional drastic changes that create new interests or
drawbacks alter the state identity. The new opportunities emerged after regional or
systemic changes accentuate the underemphasized interests of states and incite elite
and the public to seek for new interests or planning. For instance the disintegration of
Soviet Union reinforced pragmatic policies of Iran for new economic and trade
interests. Because the fall of Soviet Union created newly independent energy centers,
13
especially in Central Asia (Ramazani, 1998). This incited Iran to be effective in these
areas by improving its economic relations with these states.
Fourthly, in the crises times, states suffer identity crises, after which new
considerations would change the identity patterns. This is frequent especially the
global transitional periods such as transition from feudalism to capitalism; or
important wars that are influential in the geographic formation of a new order such as
the Hundred Years’ Wars. Besides these, the domestic crises such as revolutions,
coups and economic crises are also influential in change of the state identity.
Campbell (1992) explains the emergence of modern states system not as a
mechanistic result of Westphalia as is conventionally known, but by identity
transformations in Europe. He argues that the gap created by the defeat of the church
against Enlightenment forced the European states to seek new forms of identities
instead of the theological ones. While God filled the gap in the previous one, reason,
experience, science and modernity determined the new patterns of state identity by
the Enlightenment period. Thus, states emancipated from the will of God and became
independent and sovereign by the Enlightenment (Campbell, 1992: 43-51).
Finally, generational changes can also alter the identity of a polity (Prizel, 1998: 35).
Prizel (1998: 35) argues that the custodian of the collective memory is vital in the
evaluation of this memory. The change of custodian of a national identity influences
perceptions of the past and, consequently, the parameters of the national interest. For
instance the shah of Iran utilized Darius’s universalist and enlightened legacy to
justify the modernization in Iran. In the following generation the Shite clerics utilized
14
the Islamic background of Iran to consolidate the sharia. In both cases, both policies
were executed by inspirations from the Persian identity despite of their differences.
In sum, the theoretical model that attaches importance to the role of identity on
foreign policy argues that the tandem of international and domestic environments
both shape state identities and foreign policies. Identity as “the state of being similar
to some actors and different from others in a particular circumstance” (Chafetz et al.,
1998/1999: viii) is constructed after psychological and sociological processes; and
gives the shape of foreign policy through its assessment of the features of the
identity. Foreign policy is inherently formulated from the borders between ‘self’ and
‘other.’ Although there are some continual characteristics of foreign policies as a
result of identities, these polices along with the identities can change over time due to
several reasons: Military and diplomatic defeats can bring rapid transformations in
state identities; another important element altering the identity of a state is the
metamorphosis or the total disappearance of the ‘other’; the systemic or regional
drastic changes that create new interests or drawbacks also alter the state identity; in
the crises times, states suffer identity crises, after which new considerations would
change the identity patterns; generational changes can also alter the identity of a
polity. In the remaining parts of this chapter, it will be examined the liberal and
constructivist approaches with respect to their emphases to the role of identity on
foreign policy.
15
2. LIBERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Liberalism is fundamentally a tradition of political philosophy, emerged more or less
in the eighteenth century Europe against the traditional privileges of cosmopolitan
aristocratic elite with a set of practical goals and ideals (Lerner et al., 1988: 809).
The liberal tradition prioritizes the individual over the state with claimant of some
rights. Accordingly state plays a limited role in the society as only an arbiter in the
disputes among individuals and the state. According to the liberal conception of
political science, the issues are presented to the public opinion; and the consensus as
a result of debating these issues within the clash of ideas and interests constrains the
state behaviors (Yayla, 1999). The numerous persons representing a multitude of
interests compete to influence the decision-making processes. Rationalism
constitutes the cognitive bases of liberalism. While competing for more interests, the
individuals and groups are assumed as rational to increase their interests.
Liberalism has filtered into the discipline of International Relations by emphasizing
the importance of changeable political processes (Keohane, 1989: 10). Liberals have
sought to establish an international democratic society. By means of this democratic
society it has been aimed the protection of civil liberties and the maintenance of free
market economic relations for the establishment of a peaceful global order. As
Burchill (1996: 31) summarizes liberals concluded that the prospects for the
elimination of war lay with “a preference for democracy over aristocracy, free trade
over autarky, and collective security over the balance of power system.”
However, for many decades, especially by the impact of the legacy of the IR studies
in the 1920s and 1930s, the self-proclaimed ‘realists’ of the time, and the neorealists
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have disparaged liberalism as a form of ‘idealism’ or ‘utopianism’ (Griffiths, 1999:
51). The negative attributions towards liberalism as being not structural and well-
defined IR theory did not finish after the end of the Cold War, despite liberals have
found the opportunity to assess the legacy of their intellectual tradition and its
relevance by the collapse of the Soviet Union (Griffiths, 1999: 51). For instance,
Robert Keohane, who is fundamentally liberal, asserts (1990: 166 quoted in
Moravcsik, 1997: 515) that “in contrast to Marxism and Realism, Liberalism is not
committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural theory.” Moravcsik (1997: 514)
attributes the reason for this as the “lack of a paradigmatic status” of the liberal IR
theory. He reminds (1997: 514) us that the earlier attempts to formulate a liberal IR
theory (different approaches pertaining the priority to be given to democracy,
economic interdependence and the international legal regulation of security and
economic issue-areas) have generally ignored as a major paradigmatic alternative.
Moravcsik, in his article (1997), attempts to reformulate liberal international
relations theory in a “nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical
social science” (1994: 513). Accordingly, the fundamental premise of liberal IR
theory is that “the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and
transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behavior by
influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences” (Moravcsik, 1997:
516). The ‘configuration of state preferences’ constitutes the place in liberal IR
theory what the ‘configuration of capabilities’ constitutes in neorealism, and the
‘configuration of institutions’ constitutes in neoliberal institutionalism. The liberal IR
theory locates the identity as an input in the formation of the state preferences.
Identity plays a crucial role in the determination of the nature of the relations
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between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society. Because the
characteristics of the state and the society are not exempt from the identities of them,
which constitutes the cognitive bases of the actors embedded to state and society.
Liberal IR theory, reformulated in Moravcsik (1997), depends on three main
assumptions, which specify, respectively, the nature of the societal actors, the nature
of the state, and the nature of the international system. The theoretical mechanism,
constituted by the interaction of the premises of these theoretical assumptions, is
claimed to explain the ongoing of world politics from a liberal standpoint. Let us
respectively examine these assumptions.
2. 1.  The Primacy of Societal Actors
The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and
private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and
who organize exchange and collective action to promote
differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material
scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence
(Moravcsik, 1997: 516).
In the liberal IR theory, fundamentally, the demands of the individuals and the
societal groups have the priority over politics. As Moravcsik (1997: 517) recalls, the
“bottom up” view of politics shapes the very nature of the liberal theory.
Accordingly, political arena is assumed as a battleground for competing interests;
and political action is constituted by the aggregation of boundedly rational
individuals with “differentiated tastes, social commitments, and resource
endowments” (Moravcsik, 1997: 517). Thus, for the place of identity in liberal IR
theory, we can conclude that social group identities in a given country play an
important role in the construction of the state preferences in a “bottom-up” direction.
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In the competition among different social groups within and between states, the
identities, acquired through historical and social processes, determines the priorities
of these groups. Through the social interactions in the formation of political actions,
the individuals are treated as rational, as defined in Kantian rationalism (Kant, 1970).
The promotion of differentiated interests of these different domestic and
transnational social groups is executed under the constraints imposed by material
scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence. In this vein, the
conditions of stability in the international order can be deduced. The situation of
fundamental beliefs (complementary or divergent), the amount of material goods
(relative abundance or extreme scarcity), and the distribution of political power
(inequality or equality) are the basic constraints that influence the occurrence of
cooperation and conflict. In this respect, while complementary beliefs promote
cooperation in the domestic and international society as well, the differentiating
beliefs about the provision of borders, fundamental political institutions, social
practices and culture promote conflict. Relative abundance promotes cooperation;
because in such a situation, the actors have the lower propensity to enter into risks
for material resources. In the condition of extreme scarcity, the actors have the cost
not to enter into risks. So extreme scarcity promotes conflict. If the distribution of
power among the societal actors is equitable, then the actors will be more
cooperation seeker to continue the existing situation. However, if the power is
inequitably distributed, then actors will take risks to cause conflict, even if the costs
are very high (Moravcsik, 1997: 517).
19
2. 2. Representation and State Preferences
States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of
domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials
define state preferences and act purposively in world politics
(Moravcsik, 1997: 518).
Liberal IR theory adds the concept of state preferences to the liberal conception of
domestic politics, according to which the state is a representative institution
“constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by
coalitions of social actors” (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). The institution of representation
plays a crucial role on the formation of state policy, which is composed of the
preferences and social power of individuals and groups (Moravcsik, 1997: 518).
Concerning the institution of representation, it can undoubtedly be claimed that the
dominant individuals and groups are more fully represented by the government than
the other groups (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). The ‘fully represented groups’ are
determined by the domestic free competition in the country. In contrast to the
conventional liberal theories, the representation is not necessarily applied in a
democratic manner. There exist many representative institutions from tyranny to
democracy. The nature of the representative institutions and practices determines the
preferences of the states in the international arena (Moravcsik, 1997: 518).
The change of the ‘state preferences’ is conditional on the competition among the
societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices. The
societal pressures can also be the results of the international interactions, but not only
the outcomes of the domestic interactions among the society (Moravcsik, 1997: 519).
Preferences constitute a key concept in the liberal IR theory in the sense that the
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theory focuses on the preferences to shift the behaviors of the states other than the
strategic circumstances under which the states situate.
2. 3. Interdependence and the International System
The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines
state behavior. (Moravcsik, 1997: 520)
States formulate their foreign policy behaviors according to the societal formulation
of their preferences. The cooperation or conflict in the organization of world politics
is constituted according to the interactions of state preferences. However, this does
not mean that all the states have the freedom to implement foreign policies according
to the ideal policies of them. Contrarily, each state seeks to realize its own
preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states
(Moravcsik, 1997: 520). Thus, the configuration of the interdependent state
preferences determines the behaviors of the states in the international realm.
As can be understood, according to the liberal IR theory, it is assumed that the
patterns of the interdependent state preferences impose constraints on state behaviors
(Moravcsik, 1997: 520). The strategic situations are determined by the patterns of the
interdependence. Moravcsik divides (1997: 520-521) three broad categories for the
patterns of interdependence, according to the strategic situation that results. Firstly, if
the preferences of the differentiating states are compatible or harmonious, then there
will be strong incentives for coexistence with low conflict. Secondly, if the state
preferences are deadlocked, in other words, realizing the preferences of dominant
social groups in different countries imposes costs each other, then, there will be low
mutual gains among governments and high potential for interstate tension and
conflict. Thirdly, if there is an ambiguity and mixed situation in the motives of the
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dominant social actors of different states, then there is the possibility to negotiate
among the actors of the international system.
3. CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Constructivism is the view that prioritizes ideas over materials (Walt, 1998: 40); and
is the view that claims human action and interaction, corresponding the dynamic
normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world, shapes and shaped by
the material world (Adler, 1997: 322). In recent years, especially by the end of the
Cold War, a great appeal has been given to the constructivist approach. A great
literature has been formed on this theory especially in the post-Cold war period.4 We
have experienced “the constructivist turn in IR theory” (Checkel, 1998: 326) in
which the proponents of this theory have opened up “the black box of interest and
identity formation,” and have argued that the state interests emerge from the
interactions among the states and the international system.
Constructivism is a theory that stands between modern and postmodern IR theories.
Reminding that modern IR theories are positivist/materialist while postmodern ones
are idealist/interpretive, constructivism is an attempt to build a bridge between them
(Adler, 1997: 323). It aims to show how the subjective, intersubjective and material
worlds interact in the construction of reality, and the interactions between the
structures and agent’s identities and interests (Adler, 1997: 330). Accordingly, by
suggesting the concept of intersubjectivity, constructivist theory claims that the
social relations are established in reciprocal bases among the actors interacting, and it
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cannot be pure objectivity between the knowledge and reality. Thus, international
politics is contingent to the historical and social context. It is impossible to speak of
unchangeable international structures. The international structure, namely the
international system stemmed from the interactions among states, renews itself
according to the ongoing its relations with the states. The identity plays a critical role
in the creation of the boundaries of subjectivity in this equation. As Wendt portrays
(1994: 385) core assumptions of constructivist IR theory can be formulated as
follows:
1. States are the principle units of analysis for international
political theory;
2. The key structures in the states system are intersubjective,
rather than material; and
3. State identities and interests are in important part constructed
by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the
system by human nature of domestic politics.
The argument of “the mutual constitution of agents and structure, states and
international system” underlies at the very beginning of constructivism (Banchoff,
1999: 261). Thus, drawing upon conclusions about the nature of the state and the
nature of the international system, independent of each other, as in the liberal IR
theory is impossible in constructivist theory. In the following paragraphs I will try to
qualify the afore-mentioned assumptions in two headings. The first one is devoted to
figure out the role that is given to the state in constructivist theory with respect to the
state identities and interests. The second one will clarify the system question with
special concern to the agent-structure debate.
                                                                                                                                         
4 For instance see: Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1998; Jager, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996; Kratochwill, 1989;
Kubalkova et al., 1998; Wendt, 1992, 1994; Berger, 1996; Finnomere, 1996; Johnston, 1995, 1996;
Weldes, 1996; Ruggie, 1997.
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3. 1. State, Identity, and Interests
Like the mainstream theories of IR, constructivism accounts the states as the unit of
analysis, which operates in a social structure that is qualified by three elements:
“shared knowledge, material resources, and practices” (Wendt, 1995: 73). In the this
formulation, structure constitutes the context composed of the shared knowledge,
material resources, and practices as an outcome of the result of intersubjective
relations between states and the international system. Diverse identities of each state
are the main reason of the intersubjectivity.
Constructivism treats identity to be theorized within the social and historical context.
The self (it is what binds the group together) and the other (what situates the group
with respect to others) dimensions of the identity matters much in constructivism.
The identity creates a set of “shared norms and narratives that sustain ‘we-ness’
through time” (Banchoff, 1999: 268). By means of identity, the state finds the
opportunity to situate itself relative to other states and international institutions
(Banchoff, 1999). This provides the state to locate its position in the intersubjective
relations with the other international actors. The crucial observation here is that “the
producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the
intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning” (Hopf, 1998: 173).
The interstate relations are not sufficient to identify intersubjective meanings, but the
political and historical context is also influential in the formation of these meanings
(Weldes, 1996: 280). This historical and political context led us again to the identity.
Weldes, at this point, suggests (1996: 281) the term of ‘representations’, which
emerge on a wide array of already available cultural and linguistic resources; and
contribute to the construction of state identity and interests. These representations
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serve firstly, to populate a national vision with a variety of discourses, including to
accentuate the differences between the self and others; secondly, posit well-defined
relations among diverse discourses; and finally, locating a vision through well-
defined relations with the others, the state provides convenient background to define
national interests (Weldes, 1996: 281-282). The representations make clear to the
country who and what it is, and who and what its enemies are.
Constructivism suggests that “collective identity shapes the content of state interests
and the course of state action” (Banchoff, 1999: 262). Accordingly, since state
identity, as a view of a state's place in the world, informs particular conceptions of
the proper ends and means of its foreign policy, articulation of identity serves, at the
same time, to specify state interests (Banchoff, 1999).
Weldes (1996), while explaining the establishment of the link between identity and
interest, suggests the terms of ‘articulation’ and ‘interpellation’. According to
Weldes (1996: 284), articulation and interpellation constitute the main dimensions of
the representations, which are influential in the formation of state identity and
interests. Accordingly, articulation refers to the “process through which meaning is
produced out of cultural raw materials or linguistic resources”(Weldes, 1996: 284),
whereas interpellation refers, situating this meaning to the social world to specify the
location of the state identity in the world level. Articulation and interpellation results
the construction of national interests through producing and situating the meanings.
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3. 2. The International System
According to the constructivist IR theory, states and the international system
dialectically influence each other. Contrary to the neorealist assumption, according to
which systemic structure mostly defines the national interests and foreign policies,
constructivism suggests a mutual constitution. This is functionally adapted from the
agent-structure debate in social theory to the international politics as explained by
Wendt (1987: 337): “all social scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution
to the ‘agent-structure problem,’ which situates agents and social structures in
relation to one another.” Wendt has argued that it is impossible to deduce security-
oriented conceptions of state interest from the systemic condition of anarchy;
contrarily, “anarchy is what states make of it” (1992: 395).
Structure affects the state identities as well as state interests and policies. At the same
time, state identities have the capacity to impact the structure as well as foreign
policy and interests. Rules, as the links between states and structure, and practices, as
the method of dealing with rules, form a stable pattern suiting agents’ intentions
(Onuf, 1998: 61). To summarize with Wendt (1995: 81):
To analyze the social construction of international politics is to
analyze how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the
social structures –cooperative or conflictual- that shape actors’
identities and interests and significance of their material contexts.
To sum up, reality is constructed by the “mutual constitution” of states and the
system; i.e. codetermination of agent and structure. As a result of this theoretical
assumption, constructivism does not give the ontological priority to any of these
(agent or structure). Consequently, constructivists, for instance, accept the anarchy as
a structural pattern as neorealists, however, according to them anarchy is “mutually
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constituted by actors employing constitutive rules and social practices” (Hopf, 1998:
173). Thus, prevailing social practices at home and abroad become the constraints to
the state actions in the foreign policy realm. The table below from Jepperson, Wendt,
and Katzenstein’s study summarizes the constructivist arguments (1996: 52-53):
Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996: 53)
1. Effects of norms (I). Cultural or institutional elements of states’
environments […] shape the national security interests or
(directly) the security policies of states.
2. Effects of norms (II). Cultural or institutional elements of states’
global or domestic environments […] shape state identity.
3. Effects of identity (I). Variations in state identity, or changes in
state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of
states.
4. Effects of identity (II). Configurations of state identity affect
interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security
communities.
5. Recursivity. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct
cultural and institutional structure.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: ANALYZING
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
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In this study, it is aimed to figure out where diverse social identities stand in the
foreign policy making processes in Turkey in the post-Cold War era. This will be
done by examining Turkey’s foreign policy options according to the main premises
of liberal and constructivist IR theories. As we have already examined, liberal and
constructivist IR theories emphasize the role of identity on foreign policy to a
considerable extent. Before analyzing the approaches of these theoretical frameworks
towards Turkish foreign policy, it is necessary to identify the major social identities
participating in Turkey’s foreign policy making processes.
In this study, it will be considered basically five identities influential in Turkey’s
foreign policy making processes: Kemalist, liberal, extreme nationalist, Kurdish
nationalist and Islamic identities.
The reason for selecting these identities is the high degree of their acceptance in the
Turkish society as reflected, for example in national and local elections and in the
media. In other words, each is a legitimate part of the political system with important
social roots. Here, we should recall a confusion in terminology and the problem it
creates in drawing up precise classifications concerning social identities –a point
briefly mentioned in Section I. As previously examined, “identity” is constructed on
the basis of an understanding of the separateness of the “self” and the “other.” Often
times, however, identity operates as a substitute for the expression of one’s ideology
or worldview, thus making the conceptual distinction between the two problematic.
For example, Turkish liberals and Kemalists come under in this category. Do they
reflect or represent an identity or an ideology when they define their “self” and the
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“other?” They both represent an identity and an ideology. Having noted this
analytical difficulty, I shall nevertheless treat them as social identities.
The Kemalist identity, based upon secularism, modernization and nationalism, has a
foreign policy vision taking the geographical location where the new regime was set
up, the National Pact (Misak-i Milli), as its reference (Aras, 2000: 35). The military
and bureaucratic elite, People’s Republican Party in the political realm, associations
such as Association of Atatürkist Thought, and some journalists such as Mehmet Ali
Kışlalı and Toktamış Ateş in the social realm, represent the Kemalist identity today.
As I have expressed above, the state identity is the most influential one in the
construction of foreign policy. In the case of Turkey, the Kemalist identity as the
underlying state identity is the most influential one in the formulation of foreign
policy decisions.
The liberal identity, aiming the integration with the capitalist system, amelioration of
human rights and democracy, guaranteeing the fundamental rights of different groups
in the country, and constraining role of military in politics, is represented by the
center-right parties such as Motherland Party and True Path Party, and recently
Liberal Democrat Party in the political realm, Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen
Association, Association for Liberal Thinking, and journalists such as Mustafa
Erdoğan, Mehmet Barlas, Cengiz Çandar and Etyen Mahçupyan in the social realm.
The extreme nationalist identity, which supports a model of Turkish nationalism that
goes far beyond Kemalist territorial and civic nationalism, favors cooperation and
even integration with what is perceived to be the historical homeland of the Turkish
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people (Aras, 1998: 36). This identity is represented by Nationalist Action Party in
the political realm, associations such as Eurasian Center for Strategic Studies and
Ideal Hearths and some writers such as Yücel Hacaloğlu and Muzaffer Özdağ in the
social realm.
The Kurdish nationalist identity, claiming the acknowledgement of the fundamental
rights of the Kurds as a recognized ethnic identity by the central authority, is
represented by the People’s Democracy Party in the political realm and writers such
as Mehmet Metiner and Abdülmelik Fırat in the social realm. Some leftist groups of
non-Kurdish origin in Turkey and in Europe also support this identity.
The Islamic identity, searching for the incorporation of Turkey into the “Islamic
community of nations,” and projects Turkey as a potential leader of the Islamic
world, is represented by the newly-founded Happiness Party and Justice and
Development Party5 in the political realm, and by Islamic sects known as tarikats,
media corporations such as Kanal 7, STV, Yeni Şafak, Zaman and Akit, and writers
such as Ali Bulaç and İsmet Özel in the social realm. Their anti-Western and anti-EU
foreign policy vision changed over time to support for Turkey’s EU membership.6
After examining main theoretical considerations of liberal and constructivist IR
theories and qualifying the features of diverse social identities participating the
foreign policy making processes in Turkey in the post-Cold War era, I shall attempt
                                                
5 The Welfare Party was the major Islamic-oriented political party in the 1980s and 1990s. It was
banned in 1998. Its banner was taken up by Virtue Party which too was banned in 2001 for
unconstitutional acts. The Happiness Party was established in Summer 2001, but one faction defected
to form the Justice and Development Party.
6 Although I have tried to figure out the representatives of different social identities in Turkey, there
are not strict borders between these groups. This creates some practical problems in the analyses. For
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to deduce some implications to explain Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War
era. In the following lines, I will review the basic propositions of liberal and
constructivist IR theories, and then considering these propositions I will try to draw
upon the hypotheses that will be instrumental to explain Turkey’s foreign policy
options in the post-Cold War era.
4. 1. Liberal IR Theory and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War
As we have already examined, the liberal IR theory defined in Moravcsik  (1997)
depends upon three fundamental assumptions, namely:
1. The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals
and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-
averse and who organize exchange and collective action to
promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by
material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal
influence (Moravcsik, 1997: 516).
2. States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of
domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials
define state preferences and act purposively in world politics
(Moravcsik, 1997: 518).
3. The configuration of interdependent state preferences
determines state behavior. (Moravcsik, 1997: 520)
Considering these assumptions, we can conclude the following propositions:
1. If there are divergent fundamental beliefs among the competing domestic and/or
transnational social identities, then conflict among international actors is more
likely to happen rather than the cooperation.
                                                                                                                                         
instance, I could not locate the Democratic Left Party, which share the power in Turkey today, into
one of these five identities.
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2. If the international actors are competing for scarce material goods, then conflict
is more likely to happen.
3. If the power to influence social life is unequally distributed among the
international actors, then conflict is more likely to happen.
4. If the preferences of different international actors are converging, then
cooperation is more likely to happen.
5. If the preferences of different international actors are deadlocked, then conflict is
more likely to happen.
6. If the preferences of different international actors are not conditional to each
other, then negotiation rather than conflict or cooperation is more likely to
happen.
If it is to be identified the independent variables resulting the state behaviors in
Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy analysis in a liberal theoretical framework,
the competition among the domestic identities (Kemalist, nationalist, liberal, Kurdish
and Islamic), the transnational and international identities influencing this
competition, and the amount of material goods have to be counted. These variables
draw upon the constraints for the formation of state preferences, which are the main
instruments of foreign policy making. According to this conceptual scheme of
foreign policy making, we can hypothesize that Turkish foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era will evolve in the following way:
1. Although the dominant state (care that not national) identity -Kemalist identity-
plays the crucial role in the formation of foreign policy behaviors, the other
competing identities (liberal, national, Kurdish and Islamic identities) in the
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domestic realm have considerable impact on the foreign policy decision making
processes.
2. The material scarcity in the foreign and security environment around Turkey
constraints the success of cooperation and increases the potentials of conflict.
This material scarcity, here, implies especially in the diverging views about the
transfer of the natural resources of Central Asia and Caucasus to the West.
3. The underlying differences of divergent identities between Turkey and its
environment (for instance Europe, Russia, Iran, Iraq) increase the potentials of
conflict and decrease the potentials of cooperation.
4. Since the state preferences of Turkey, the European states, and the Eurasian
states are not in deadlocked position (not zero-sum game) and are diversified,
negotiations are to be expected as foreign policy behavior rather than conflict or
full cooperation.
4. 2. Constructivist IR Theory and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War
As we have already examined, the constructivist IR theory depends upon the
following fundamental assumptions, namely (Wendt, 1994: 385):
1. States are the principle units of analysis for international
political theory.
2. The key structures in the states system are intersubjective,
rather than material.
3. State identities and interests are in important part constructed
by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the
system by human nature of domestic politics.
Considering these assumptions, we can conclude the following propositions:
1. If there exists a change in state identities, then the state interests and, to a some
extent, the structure are reconstructed.
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2. If there are great debates and discourses in one state, then the international system
will also be affected from this discourse to a certain extent.
3. If the configuration of the state identities carries an heterogeneous structure, then
the conlifcts among these states are more likely to happen.
4. If there are exogeneous effects given to the states, then the identities and interests
of the states will change to result in changes in foreign policy behaviors.
If it is to be identified the independent variables resulting the state behaviors in
Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy analysis in a constructivist framework, social
identities formed in social and historical context (again Kemalist, liberal, nationalist,
Kurdish and Islamic identities), and the international structures that impose upon
constraints on the formation of identity and interests of the states have to be counted.
These variables draw upon the constraints for the formation of state identities, which
are the main instruments of foreign policy making through constructing national
interests. According to this conceptual scheme of foreign policy making, we can
hypothesize that Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era will evolve in the
following way:
1. The discourses out of the diverse social identities (Kemalist, liberal, nationalist,
Kurdish and Islamic identities) have impacts on the construction of national
interests, and concomitantly foreign policy behaviors. These behaviors also
influence the structural patterns through constructing norms.
2. The identites that influence the construction of interests and foreign policies are
constructed in the social and historical context in which Turkey is situated.
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3. The transnational and international social and political ideas (such as
globalization or nationalism) have impact upon the construction of state identities
(for instance, accentuating the liberal or nationalist discourses) and interests (for
instance, imposing some behaviors to close Turkey to Europe or Eurasia).
4. The configuration of the identities in Turkey, Europe, Eurasia and other regions,
where Turkey is interrelated, has considerable impact upon the construction of
Turkey’s identity, interests and foreign policies; and in turn the structure of the
interactions.
These hypotheses will provide us analytical frameworks in the following chapters,
when it will be analyzed the place of identity in Turkish foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era within the propositions of liberal and constructivist IR theories. In this
respect the following chapter will examine Turkish foreign policy towards Europe;
and the last chapter will examine the other option, namely, Eurasian option.
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CHAPTER 2:
TURKEY’S EUROPEAN OPTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA
The end of the Cold War had diversified the strategic options that Turkey had
confronted. During the Cold War, the United States, the Western European countries
and Turkey had the same strategic aims. A strategic culture against the enemy of
Soviet Union under the NATO umbrella had evolved. However, after the end of the
Cold War, the options of United States and Western Europe had been varied as well
as the options of Turkey. Thus, the patterns of Turkey’s relations with the West in
general and with Europe in particular have changed. The priorities of the United
States and Europe varied. Turkey has found itself in an ambivalence strategic
equation between these varying approaches and its own priorities. On the other side,
the demise of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has opened up new opportunities and
new strategic possibilities for Turkey. There has been realized the traditional and
historical affinities between Turkey and the newly founded states of the former
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This incited the nationalist reflexes in Turkey and
brought nationalism as an important input into Turkish foreign policy. As a result,
Turkey has found itself between two fundamental foreign policy options: (i) to
accentuate its centuries-old European orientation by integrating with the European
Union, which is claimed to be the institutional representation of the European
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identity; (ii) to have a sphere of influence and to be leader of the newly independent
Turkish Republics in Eurasia.7
In this chapter, I will examine Turkey’s European option with special respect to the
explanations of liberal and constructivist IR theories. In this context, firstly I will
search for the institutional and historical contexts that have been influential in the
construction of Turkey’s European identity. Then, I will review Turkey’s relations
with Europe in the post-Cold War era within the context of differentiating discourses
and debates among diverse identities in Turkey toward Turkey’s place in Europe. In
so doing, I will touch upon how Turkey’s preferences and interests towards Europe
have been constructed.
1. INSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS
Turkey, since the Ottoman times, had the common issues with Europe. As Aydın
points out (1999: 160) that in the course of the history, “the Turks have been
connected to the West, first as a conquering superior and enemy, then as a
component part, later as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a
follower and ally.” Ottoman Empire gradually lost its dominant status against Europe
and began to perceive Europe as the source of modernization. This perception left its
place the process of the internalization of Europe. From the Tanzimat era onwards
Ottoman Empire commenced to imitate Europe in socio-cultural, political and legal
spheres. Giving rights to the minorities in the empire, implementing Western
                                                
7 For a literature on the options of Turkish foreign policy see: Sayari, Fall 2000; Mango, 1994;
Makovsky, 1999.
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oriented laws with the proclamation of the Constitutional monarchy can be counted
as the examples of this change.
This Europeanization project reached its culmination point by the founding of the
Republic. Especially, establishment of political organization in the form of nation-
state, which can be assumed as the political extension of the Enlightenment thought
of Europe, was perceived as the way of progress. During all the times before the
Republican era, Ottoman Empire was in Europe but was not a part of Europe in the
sense that the two parties were parts of different civilizations (Aktan, 1999: 56).
These two civilizations negatively conceived of each other as being the ‘other’ of
each (Yurdusev, 1997: 68). It can be said that by the Kemalist reforms, the aim of the
Turkish elite was to remove this difference and to create a new “modern” and
“civilized” nation.
From the proclamation of the Republic onwards, Turkey’s reforming elite has
perceived Europe as a source of “enlightenment and modernization, and the key
driving principles for a future Turkish state” (Fuller, 1999: 161). Along this
perception, the founding principles of the Republic were drawn from the
Enlightenment thought of Europe. The basic characteristics of the welcomed state
identity in the early Republican era moved Turkey toward Europe. These were
nationalism and secularism.
Analyzing these characteristics, it can easily be seen that the aim of the modernizing
elite was to be integrated within the European states system, incorporation with the
Western-centered capitalist world economy, being a part of European identity in
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social terms. The first, and the most important characteristic of this project was
founding a modern nation-state based on the experience of nationalism in Europe.
Kemalism, as a modernization project inspired by Europe, aimed to create a
homogenous society in which the nature of the relations between society and state
were defined by state (Keyman, 1999: 185). In formulating such a society, elite of
the newly emerged Republic attached importance to invent the unique Turkish
culture. Culture was to delineate the borderlines of being Turk from the other nations
of the world. In this sense, the builders of the new national identity applied an
orchestrated campaign to cultivate a Turkish nation (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 23).
The second characteristic of the newly emerging Republic was secularization of the
political, even social life.  Secularism, by which Europe invented its ‘Europeanness’
out of a Christian legacy, is also one of the underlying features of European
civilization. The most important issue that can be counted in this respect was the
abandonment of Islamic elements in the formation of national identity. Since the aim
in Mustafa Kemal’s understanding was to create a modern state from an empire,
Islam became a threat to this formation. As Binnaz Toprak (1981: 45) conforms it
was understandable that Islam, as having universal supra-national concept of
solidarity, was inimical to the interests of the newly emerging nation-state. In this
sense the reforms such as the abolition of the Sultanate, the proclamation of the
Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate, the abolition of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs and Pious Foundations, abolition of religious courts, dissolution of the
dervish orders, reform of the calendar, adoption of the Swiss Civil Code,
disestablishment of the state religion, adoption of Latin alphabet, replacing the sharia
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with European legal codes, closing religious institutions and orders, banning the fez
and enforcing to dress European style hat, expanding women’s rights were pursued.
Kemalist project was fundamentally a modernization project. In this modernizing
process, the ultimate model was Europe. Throughout the nation-building process of
the Turkish Republic, Westernization (to be equal to Europeanization) has become a
legitimizing factor of all the other reforms. Indeed, nationalism was itself a
‘Western’ concept, which had developed after the French Revolution. Atatürk, who
was deeply influenced by the Enlightenment thought system of Europe, specified the
“contemporary civilization” (muasır medeniyet) as the aim to be reached. He
reflected this notion of thought to the reforms he committed. In Robin’s views (1998:
152), he committed two ways in the Westernization process: borrowing the European
practices of civilization and suppressing the anti-European elements in the domestic
sphere.
Within the borders drawn by the afore-mentioned characteristics, elites of Turkey
pursued an Europeanization strategy. After 1945, the efforts of Europeanization had
also shifted to the realm of foreign policy from the cultural extents (Kubicek, 1999:
162). The main motive of this policy shift was the threat of Soviet Union, and
concomitantly communism. Turkey’s relations with Soviet Union had paralyzed after
the end of the Second World War. Soviet Union did not accept to renew the non-
aggression agreement that had been signed in 1925 and would expire in the April of
1945. This combined with the Communist expansionist ideals of the Soviet Russia
threatened Turkey and had become an incentive for Turkey to prefer the Western
alliance. Turkey was also important for the West in security terms to prevent the
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expansion of the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Turkey implemented a
Western oriented foreign policy after the Second World War. In this context, it
committed the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, included NATO in 1952 and
joined the Council of Europe and OECD at their inceptions. In 1959, itt applied to be
a member of the European Economic Community, which established as the
economic axis of the Western alliance in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome; and signed
Ankara Treaty in 1963 by which Turkey became an associate member and looked
ultimately to gain the full membership.
By the signing of Ankara Treaty, Turkey’s relations with the European Community
began. Meanwhile Turkey had a strategic importance for the members of the
European Community in the bipolar system of that time as being a border patrol of
NATO against the Soviet Union. From the signing of the treaty to the 1970s,
Turkey’s relations with Europe have not experienced difficulties. In 1970s, as a
result of paralyzing world economies, the Western states searched for détente with
the Soviet Union to decrease the military expenditures. This détente policy slimmed
the bonds between Turkey and the states of the Western alliance and the importance
of Turkey in security terms relatively decreased (Eralp, 1997: 93-95).
In this era, the World Economic Crisis also harshly influenced the Turkish economy.
Under these circumstances, it was very difficult for Turkey to carry out its
obligations related with its relations with the European Community. The economic
problems were not the sole incompatibility of Turkey with the European Community.
There was also a fragmented public opinion towards the Europe in Turkey in 1970s.
The businessmen who were the heritage of an isolationist tradition of Turkey and
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some radical Islamic and leftist groups were against the European idea and they
showed their discontents in the public sphere at those times. The businessmen and
some governmental organizations such as State Planning Organization were
defending to postpone the customs union not to injure the national development of
the country. In this context, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit applied the Community to
delay the customs union for five years. This application combined with the Greece’s
application to be a full member of the Community in 1975 raised the difficulties in
the relations between Turkey and the European Union.  Moreover by the second half
of the 1970s by détente with the Soviet Union the Community initiated the
democratic development in Europe and the process, in which ‘democracy’ is
accepted as a part of ‘being European’, began by which Turkey would bear many
difficulties in the following years (Eralp, 1997: 95-99).
Even though there were experienced some difficulties, the relations between Turkey
and Europe had not been questioned deeply in identity concerns during much part of
the Cold War era. The ideological concerns of the East/West distinction of the era
basically colored the relations. Turkey was attributed as an important strategic
partner for the containment of the Soviet Union in security terms. Security priorities
had masked the identity differences between Turkey and Europe in that era. The
military intervention in Turkey had played the great role in the change of the nature
of the relations as well as the developments experienced in the European
Community. After this time, political issues had gained the priority. Especially after
the collapse of the bipolar world system in the beginning of the nineties, the
difference between the Turkish way of modernization and the European civilization
itself had been clearly exposed.
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2. EUROPE AS A TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY OPTION IN THE POST-
COLD WAR ERA
2. 1. The Review of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Europe in the Post-Cold
War Era
In the Cold War years Turkey was significantly important for the European security.
This was indubitable in those years and Turkey used this advantage in favor of itself
to gain economic and military support from the West. However, the end of the Cold
War shifted the former balance of security. By the removal of the Soviet threat,
Turkey's importance for the defense of Europe relatively decreased. In 1991, Turkey
committed to the Gulf War in the side of the Western alliance to show its strategic
importance to the West although it lost a great deal of its economic interests in the
region. However, this does not mean that Turkey became an unimportant state in
security terms. The emergence of the new geopolitics also put Turkey into an
important position. On the other side, the end of the Cold War decreased the
importance of geopolitical issues, at least for the Europeans. The issues related with
democracy and human rights gained prominence. Turkey, on the other hand, seemed
to face geopolitical opportunities in the post-Cold War era. These differentiating
perspectives between Turkey and Europe have become the main problematic of the
relations between Turkey and Europe (Karaosmanoğlu, 1999).
Europe has greater interest in democratization in Turkey than does USA, whose
strategic security concerns dominate most other interests. Richard Holbrooke, then
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assistant secretary of state for Europe, in 1995 has enumerated the sensitivities of
Europe with regard to Turkey. Accordingly, he has firstly emphasized the importance
of the development of democracy, secular state, prosperous economy, and human
rights standards. He then counts Turkey’s importance for its geopolitical location that
is close to the strategically important regions such as the Balkans, Cyprus, the
Aegean, Middle East, and Caspian Region (Tirman, 1998: 61).
As seen from Holbrooke’s evaluations, the democratic issues have prominence over
the strategic ones in the eyes of Europeans. On the other side, the prospect of
membership offers an important means of influencing Turkish policy. As Larrabee
writes (1997: 168), “if Turkey believes it has no prospect for EU membership,
Ankara will have less incentive to improve its human rights record.” Thus, for the
advocates of liberalism in Turkey, it is important to keep the European Union option
open even if Turkey may not be ready for admission for a long time. Besides this
democratizing effect, institutionalizing the relations with the EU would provide
Turkey the opportunity to balance its relations with the US and have wider space for
maneuvers. Severing ties with the EU increases dependence on the US. In fact, the
criticisms coming from Europe are occasionally mentioned in the US as well. A
divided US Congress gives the impression that a difficult period may be awaiting
Turkey in the relations with the US. Furthermore, economic ties with Europe also
take an undeniable importance for a well functioning economy in Turkey.
Considering these factors, there is no Western option for Turkey outside of Europe
(Çandar and Fuller, 2001: 37).
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However, there are some problems in Turkey’s European Union option. One
hesitation of Europe about integration of Turkey into the Union is the security issues
that would arise upon integration. That is, Turkey's inclusion to the Union would
shift the borders of the European Union towards to East that would make Middle
East and Caucasus as neighbors for European Union. This also means that the
security issues of aforementioned regions such as such as proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction in the Middle East, Middle East peace process, unstable Iranian and
Iraqi regimes, would relatively become to the European agenda. Europe is reluctant
to take part in these issues. At this point it should be noted that the problems in the
Caucasus are relatively important for the security of the Eastern flank of Europe. In
this sense combined with the ethnic problems in the Balkans, Europe would gain
from Turkey's inclusion to the Union by which it would expand its boundaries as if it
contains these unstable areas.
One of the main problems on the agenda of the parties is the debate over the
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The establishment of a European
defense and security system independent of the NATO is leading to frictions between
Turkey and the EU. Turkey wants to have a vote about the issues related with the
ESDI. However, the EU members are against the participation of Turkey to the
decision-making processes of ESDI until it would be a full member to the Union.
Turkey is also against the use of NATO’s facilities within the framework of ESDI,
where Turkey has no vote for the decisions. Turkey’s exclusion from even from the
security architecture of Europe, raises the hesitations about the Union. Because as
known, security was one of the strongest links tying Turkey to Europe and vice
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versa. Thus, we have come to a period, in which the Copenhagen criteria affect
Turco-EU relations regarding the security concerns.
Besides these hesitations, there are a number of reasons that create difficulties in the
relations between Turkey and the European Union. Firstly, European attitudes
toward Turkish membership remain ambivalent, may be for the differences between
the political cultures of both parties. Thus Europe is not adopting a more proactive
approach to Turkish membership. Secondly, this option also requires important
changes in Turkey’s own policy, especially toward human rights, Cyprus and the
Kurdish issues. The nationalist impulse in Turkey is not willing to make these
changes, even for the European membership. Thirdly, it would take a long time to be
fully integrated with the European Union. Even under the best conditions, Turkey
would be ready for the membership at least for 15 to 20 years (Larrabee, 2000: 49).
2. 2. Foreign Policy Discourses and Debates among Diverse Social Identities in
the Formation of State Preferences and the Construction of National Interests
Given the afore-mentioned institutional and historical background on the formation
of Turkey’s European identity, and the review of Turkish foreign policy towards
Europe in the post-Cold War era, let me examine the to figure out how the diverse
social identities have influenced the foreign policy making in Turkey. This will
enable us analytical instruments to conceive the formation of state preferences
(according to liberal IR theory) and the construction of state interests (according to
constructivist IR theory). Here, it will be analyzed the impacts of the diverse national
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identities other than Kemalism, which is the dominant identity in the state level.
Kemalism, also has an important social and political base in Turkey, however, since
it is the dominant identitiy affecting directly the foreign policy decisions, I will not
include it in the following paragraphs. There will be some references to Kemalism in
analyzing the other social identities, namely, liberal, nationalist, Kurdish and Islamic
identities.
2. 2. 1. Liberal Groups
The liberal identity in Turkey is represented by the center-right parties such as
Motherland Party and True Path Party, and recently Liberal Democrat Party in the
political realm, Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association, Association for
Liberal Thinking, and some writes such as Mustafa Erdoğan, Mehmet Barlas, Cengiz
Çandar and Etyen Mahçupyan in the social realm.
Liberals welcome the European option for Turkish foreign policy, in the sense that
Turkey’s liberal orientation would be consolidated by means of this option.
According to these groups, Turkey’s integration with the world capitalist system, the
amelioration of human rights and democracy in Turkey, guaranteeing the
fundamental rights of different groups in the country, constraining the role of
military in politics, and having a well-functioning political competence are only
possible with the critical decision of Turkey to prefer the European option.
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Considering the main premises of liberal IR theory, the liberal groups along with
other social identities have the capability to influence the formation of state
preferences. Let me examine this process. The liberal identity has played some role
in the formulation of state preferences; however, its role has been constrained by the
borders of the Kemalist premises. For instance, Turkey has realized some liberal
economic and political reforms within the context of its bid to be a member of the
European Community/Union; but these reforms, for instance, have not been touched
upon the acknowledgement of the ethnic identities in Turkey, which is a pro-liberal
policy while anti-Kemalist policy in the sense that Kemalism does not recognize
different ethnic identities in line with its homogeneous nature. However, this does
not falsify liberal IR theory; because, according to this theory, the dominant social
identity has the priority in the formation of state preferences.
Although liberal IR theory does accept the capabilities of transnational identities in
the formation of state preferences, its main view on the foreign policy formulations is
from state to system; i.e. a bottom-up view. Thus, when it is considered the influence
of supranational trends on the formation of domestic identities and the national
interests, the constructivist IR theory best explains the mechanism of the foreign
policy decision-making processes. When we locate this to the impacts of liberal
identities to the foreign policy making processes, we will have the opportunity to
analyze the impact of globalization, as an exogenous variable, to the liberal discourse
in Turkey. In this respect the following analysis will fill the gaps of liberal IR theory.
The discourse of liberalism has gained momentum after the end of the Cold War. By
“the penetration of globalization into all aspects of life” (Aras, 2000: 41) after the
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end of the Cold War has accelerated the process. At the same time, we should note
that Turkey’s bid for the European Union membership also brought the strengthening
of the liberal discourse in the country. The globalization process imposed liberal
democracy as if it is the “universal political standard of civilization” (McGrew,
1997). Looking at the democratization process in Latin America and Eastern Europe
and the common policies of European Union on democracy, according to which
democratization has become an important foreign policy instrument towards the third
parties, can easily depict the strength of the liberal discourse in the world level. It is
of course impossible for a country at the threshold of the European Union not to be
affected from the liberalization discourse. As a result, human rights and
democratization, liberal market economy, the necessity of the integration with the
European Union, demands for restructuring in economic, political, cultural and social
fields has dominated the agenda of the 1990s in Turkey.
As seen, the interactions of the globalization and liberal identities in Turkey
approached Turkey towards Europe. This also influenced the identity patterns in
Turkey. In this respect, there had been realized many liberalizing reforms throughout
1990s: Some restrictions on the use of Kurdish language were removed; the private
broadcasting companies has ended the state's monopoly over broadcasting; articles
141, 142 and 163 of Turkish penal code, relating to the ideological advocacy of
communism, separatism and religions based governments, were repealed; limitations
on the political participation by trade unions, academicians, and students were eased;
a State Ministry of Human Rights and a Parliamentary Human Rights Commission
were established (Kılıç, 1998: 103).
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2. 2. 2. Extreme Nationalist Groups
The national identity is represented by Nationalist Action Party in the political realm,
associations such as Eurasian Center for Strategic Studies and Ideal Hearths and
some writers such as Yücel Hacaloğlu and Muzaffer Özdağ in the social realm.
1990s has observed the rise of nationalism in Turkey, in parallel with the rise of
liberalization policies. There are several reasons for the rise of nationalism. The new
configuration of the geopolitics by the end of the Cold War, the deterioration of
Turkey’s relations with the European Union, and the internationalization of the
Kurdish issue after the Gulf War of 1991 can be assumed as the main reasons. Some
external events occurred by the end of the Cold War played an important role in the
“reimagination of identity” (Yavuz, 1998). The independence of former Soviet
Republics by the demise of the Soviet Union, the political reemergence of Muslim
communities in the Balkans by the dissolution of Yugoslavia increased the
consciousness of a national identity in the Turkish public. Besides this new
geopolitical configuration, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, the Bosnia crisis, and recurring tensions with Greece (especially over
Cyprus) have also strengthened the nationalist impulse (Lesser, 2000: 9). Turkey, in
1990s, for the first time in Republican history, considered the protection of Muslims
outside its borders as an integral duty of its foreign policy (Yavuz, 1998: 37).
As a result, nationalist groups began to search for new options rather than Europe.
They have shown the identity differences between Turkey and Europe as the main
reason not to cooperate with the European Union. Their claims become meaningful
according to the propositions of liberal IR theory. Europe’s emphasis on the human
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rights record and Kurdish issue in Turkey has been attributed as the main indicator of
these conflicting identities. According to them it is impossible to be integrated with
Europe in the existence of underlying differences between Turkey and Europe.
Accordingly, in the conception of nationalists, Europe is a threat against the
indivisible integrity of Turkey with its state and nation; and for this, Europe is
supporting the Islamists and Kurds, under the pretext of more tolerance and freedom
of action for their views (Lesser, 2000: 8). Nationalists easily ignore that the
emphasis on democracy and human rights gain a meaningful assertion within the
boundaries of European identity. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the problems of
human rights and democracy between Turkey and Europe are sprang out of the
diverging identities as liberal IR theory claims.
In a constructivist framework, we can claim that the accentuation of nationalism in
Turkey, interrelated with the Europe’s foreign policy behaviors, have resulted in the
deterioration of Turkey-European Union relations. This interaction has created the
norms of the structure of the relations. Turkey’s frustration in its relations with the
European Union has reinforced the nationalist impulse. Europe’s position during the
Bosnia crisis, and Turkey’s losses after the Gulf War were the first signs of
deteriorating relations between the parties. In the following years, the integration of
Eastern and Central European countries to the European Union has raised the
questions for the definition of “Europeanness” and contributed to the re-examination
of Turkey’s relations with Europe. Turkey, as a long-standing associate member of
the EU, has seen former communist and newly independent states ahead of Turkey in
the membership queue. The Luxembourg Summit, when it became evident that EU
did not even contemplate the start of an accession process for Turkey, has deepened
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the tension between Turkey and the European Union. As a result, the nationalist
impulse has become an obstacle to the Europeanization of Turkey, which connotes
the cohabitation of multiple identities and cultural traits within the country in a legal
framework.
The perception of the nationalists toward the EU policies to attribute them the acts of
intervention to the state sovereignty of Turkey creates irrevocable problems in
Turkey’s bid for European integration. This led the foreign policy horizons of Turkey
to the U.S., which does not question Turkey concerning its domestic politics, as does
the EU. However, this does not mean that the nationalist outlook allow the
intensification of the relations between Turkey and US. Contrarily, the nationalist
tendency has the potential to complicate Turkey’s relations with the United States,
especially Turkey’s policies about the political status of the Northern Iraq. More
active nationalist sentiment does not allow close cooperation with the United States
in regional issues, including the use of Turkish facilities for contingencies in the
Gulf, the Balkans, and it makes cooperation less automatic and less predictable
(Lesser, 2000: 12).
2. 2. 3. Kurdish Nationalists
The Kurdish identity is represented by the People’s Democracy Party in the political
realm and writers such as Mehmet Metiner and Abdülmelik Fırat in the social realm.
The leftist groups other than the Kurdish origin in Turkey and in Europe also support
this identity. The Kurdish question of Turkey, and the debate and discourses around
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this issue is one of the most important issues of in Turkey’s European policy. In
Nachmani’s terms (1999) “the Kurdish problem confronts Turkey with a complex
challenge that threatens its territorial integrity and overshadows its external
relations.”8 Sezer (1992: 30-31), also sees the issue as “intimately and often
conflictually intermeshed with fundamental issues pertaining to the country’s
territorial integrity, the nature of its political regime and the orientation of its foreign
policy.” The end of the Gulf War took it in the agenda of the international society
while it has completely internationalized by the flee of Abdullah Öcalan from Syria
to Russia and Italy and his arrest in Kenya in 1998-1999 period.
The proponents of the Kurdish identity claim the acknowledgement of the
fundamental rights of Kurds as a distinct recognized national group by the central
authority. Mainly, the problem stems from the failure of “ethos of modernization to
create a unitary state and the participatory society within which Kurdish ethnic and
cultural identity might have flourished without challenging the state” (Sezer, 1992:
31). Although there had seen some Kurdish uprisings throughout the Republican
history, by the mid-1980s, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) led the emergence of an
increasingly violent Kurdish insurgency in Southeastern Anatolia. At the same time,
a new Kurdish political activism has been seen across the political spectrum. Many
political parties have been established in 1990s to represent the Kurdish population
in Turkey. Their demand was to be granted by cultural, social and political rights,
and represented equally in the society. The regime that was established following the
1980 coup has enacted a restrictive Law on Publications in Languages other than
Turkish, but that law was repealed in 1991. Today, Kurdish is no longer banned in
                                                
8 On this issue see: Yeğen, 1998; Barkey and Fuller, 1998; Robins, 1993.
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the context of cultural activities. In practice, Kurdish music, folklore, and customs
are all permitted, as are publications in Kurdish in any form. Now, the main demands
of the Kurds remain the formal recognition of their existence as a people inside
Turkey, to allow Kurdish to be taught in schools, to allow Kurdish-language in
broadcasting, and to enjoy some degree of local governance. However, Ankara sees
these demands as the derivations of classification, categorization, and regulation of
minority languages, and perceives as threat to the unitary structure of the country
(Gündüz, 2001: 24).
Within the borders of the liberal IR theory, the competence to influence the state
preferences by the proponents of the Kurdish identity have seen itself in the Turkey’s
foreign policy toward Europe. Although homogeneous nature of the Turkish identity
does not allow for the institutionalization of minorities along racial lines, individuals
may be able to realize their aspirations within the democratic system (Gündüz, 2001:
24) as a precondition to the European Union membership. The aspirations of the
Kurdish groups are constrained by the dominant state identity in line with the
premises of liberal IR theory. The political elite except extreme nationalists believes
that there should be some amelioration in the issue at least for the EU membership.
For instance, during his speech to the Diyarbakır Regional ANAP Meeting in
December 1999, deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz said, “Today I am here since I
believe that the road to the EU passes through Diyarbakır.” Stressing that democracy
is the right of both Kurds and Turks, he proposed the abolishment of the State of
Emergency (OHAL) in the region (Yılmaz, 1999). However, it should be noted that
still, the Turkish approach towards the Kurdish problem contrasts with the consensus
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in most EU countries about the treatment of ethnic minorities after the end of the
Cold War.
There are some conflicting preferences between Turkey and the countries of Europe.
According to liberal IR theory, it is not expected a near cooperation between Europe
and Turkey in the existence of conflicting fundamental convictions on the issue.
Many parliamentarians of the European Union have difficulties in sharing the
Turkish view on the issue that there are no minorities in the country except those
explicitly mentioned in the treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This is commentated as a
narrow legal approach to the phenomenon of identity, which is mainly based on the
nature of the Turkish identity that suggests the doctrine of the indivisibility of the
Turkish nation and state (Kramer, 1998: 220). The emergence of ethnic conflicts,
especially in the Balkans, with the demise of the bipolar world order increased the
consciousness of the European countries on the acknowledgement of minority rights.
This, combined with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, has brought Turkey’s
Kurdish issue under closer scrutiny. The Europeans argue that the Kurds are an
ethnic minority that deserves protection of its distinct identity and Turkish state
should recognize their identity. On the other side the Turkish statesmen do not accept
this thesis and argue that the Kurds are not minority but the equal citizens of the
country, and the problem in the Southeastern region is fundamentality the problem of
terrorism. For instance, Turkish foreign minister İsmail Cem’s writes (1999) that “It
is not an excuse or a pretext, but it is obvious that some of the difficulties were
mainly due to the horrible terrorist/secessionist campaign which we faced.” Cem also
adds (1999) that terrorism came into its ends in Turkey, so the reform in this region
will accelerate.
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These diverging perspectives have exacerbated the tensions with the EU. Many
Turks have convinced that Europe does not want to understand Turkey’s problems.
European reactions to human rights violations and military campaigns in South-
Eastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq have increased “the indignation in Turkey, where
the Kurdish issue is strictly viewed through the prism of the territorial integrity of the
state” (Jung and Piccoli, 2000: 94). The Turks perceive the West’s incitement for
political solutions to the Kurdish issue as part of a tricky agenda aimed at
undermining the state’s unity.
The basic premise of the constructivist IR theory, namely the mutual constitution of
agents and structure, has the capacity to explain the location of this issue in Turkish
foreign policy making. As known, the discourses for the acknowledgement of the
minority rights in Europe; and the increase of uprisings against the central authority
by the Kurdish terrorist groups are the coinciding events (structuration between agent
and structure). Turkish foreign policy, influenced by the crises in its Southeastern
region, recreated itself against the European Union; and has been forced to situate
itself as if defending the European liberal values within the boundaries of the
dominant state ideology of Kemalism.
2. 2. 4. Islamic Groups
The Islamic identity is represented by the Happiness Party and Justice and
Development Party in the political realm, several Islamic groups so-called tarikats,
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media corporations such as Kanal 7, STV, Yeni Şafak, Zaman and Akit, and writers
such as Ali Bulaç and İsmet Özel in the social realm. In the recent years the Islamic
groups have increased their power to influence the formation of state preferences and
construction of the national interests. The rise of the Islamic movements dates back
to the 1980 military coup, when the military elite saw Islam as a “bulwark against
communism and a substitute for class-based ideologies” (Sakallıoğlu, 1998: 17). The
military government embraced Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the new state ideology.
New textbooks for civilian and military schools were prepared to disseminate this
ideology.9 In the following period, the neoliberal policies of Turgut Özal has led the
rise of a pro-Islamist bourgeoisie, the formation of a new Islamist elite by the
expansion of media and religious education (Yavuz, 1998: 29). In many occasions,
the state has used the language of the Islamists to “examine certain European
attitudes toward Bosnia Herzegovina, Chechnya, Cyprus and Turkey” (Yavuz, 1998:
33).
However, in the following years, the Islamic movements have enormously
strengthened so that the state could not control them. The expansion of mass media
and communications, higher education, the development of a pro-Islamist
bourgeoisie have played a critical role in the new public emergence of an Islamic
identity discourse in the Turkish society.10 The rise of urban tarikats and the
development of a group of Muslim intellectuals in the post-Cold War period created
a new domain for the politicians seeking votes in a more democratic system, as
                                                
9 For instance a textbook, Okutan and Durukan, 1981, has aimed to demonstrate a close connection
between Sunni Islam and nationalism and between the Prophet Muhammed and Atatürk.
10 The market share of Islamic journals and newspapers was only 7 percent before 1980; by 1996, it
had risen to 47 percent, with 110 weekly and monthly Islamist journals in circulation. In addition,
there are over 16 national and 15 regional television stations, as well as 300 local ones. Radio is even
more extravagant: 35 national stations, 109 regional and almost 1000 local ones. Also by 1997, there
57
compared the earlier periods. Many graduates of İmam Hatip schools have filled
bureaucratic positions in the government during 1980s and 1990s. As a result of new
bureaucratic structuring, the Turkish secular elite lost its former dominance and
coherence in political affairs (Yavuz, 1998: 32).
On the other side, the accentuating Islamic identity has created new political
opportunities for the Islamist political party of Turkey, namely Welfare Party (RP).
In 1995 general elections, RP, gaining 21,4 percent of the votes, has become the
leading party. And after the elections a new government, consists of RP and DYP
(True Path Party), has come to power. This development gave Turkey’s Middle East
policy a new dimension. Prime Minister Erbakan, the leader of Refah, has made
rapprochement in the relations with the Islamic world a top priority. For instance, 23
billion dollars natural gas deal was concluded with Iran in August 1996.
Furthermore, he has sought to develop a Muslim economic grouping, the D-8
consisting of Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Nigeria and
Turkey, as an alternative to the G-7. However, it should also be noted that Erbakan
has been careful not to take any major foreign policy initiatives that would “seriously
jeopardize the relations with the West” (Larrabee, 1997: 149). This resulted in the so-
called “28 February process” in 1997, by which the National Security Council forced
the government to enact a set of new laws to prevent the rise of Islamic movements
to a level to jeopardize the secular nature of the Republican regime.
After the 28 February process, the pressures against the government have increased
to force it to resign. Finally, the Refahyol government has resigned at the middle of
                                                                                                                                         
were 561 Imam Hatip schools with 492809 students; only 37 of them had been founded by the state.
See: Yavuz, 1998: 31.
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1997. And Welfare Party has been banned by a decision of the Constitutional Court
in 1998. Then, a new party, namely Virtue Party (FP) has been founded in the same
year, which would also be banned in June 2001 by the Constitutional Court. The
main rationale of the foreign policy behaviors of the Welfare Party that has displayed
endeavors to move Turkey towards the Islamic world was the conviction that the
identities of Turkey and that of the Europe were diverging to be integrated under one
umbrella. As the liberal IR theorists suggest, the divergent fundamental beliefs
between Europe and Turkey were seen as the sources of friction rather than
cooperation.
After the closing of the Virtue Party, the Islamic identity in the political realm has
been divided into basically two separate parties, the Happiness Party and the Justice
and Development Party. While the Hapiness Party is insistence to continue its
decades-old ideas on foreign policy realm inherited from the Welfare and Virtue
Parties, which I have explained in the above paragraphs,  the Justice and
Development Party seeks to stand itself to the center-right position in Turkish
politics. For instance, in their program, they favor the European Union membership.
On the other hand, the rise of Islam, especially in the first half of the 1990s, has
played an important role for the creation of an alternative discourse against the
Europeanization, namely neo-Ottomanism, to which we can analyze with respect to
the constructivist IR theory. According to Hakan Yavuz (1998: 22) the interactions
of the following developments led to the emergence of neo-Ottomanism: the
domestic societal transformations within the emergence of a new liberal political and
economic milieu; and the international developments such as the collapse of the
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Soviet Union, the Cyprus crisis, Turkey’s exclusion from the European Union
processes, European inaction to the crises in Balkans, and the rise of Kurdish ethno-
nationalism in Southeastern Turkey.
In neo-Ottomanism, it can be seen the dialectical relations between the domestic and
international discourses to result a new foreign policy behavior in Turkish foreign
policy. These discourses intersubjectively influence each other as in the
constructivist IR formulation of foreign policy. This idea suggested that Turkey
could play a major role in its region by means of its Islamic identity as in the
Ottoman times. As suggested in the constructivist IR theory, the policy was
formulated within the social and historical context. Özal opened this debate arguing
(1992:14 quoted in Yavuz, 1998: 24) that:
Just as it was during the Ottoman Empire, it is possible today to
transcend ethnic differences through Islamic identity. I believe that
most powerful single constituting element of identity in this
society is Islam. It is religion that blends Muslims of Anatolia and
the Balkans. Therefore, Islam is a powerful cement of co-existence
and cooperation among diverse Muslim groups… Being a Turk in
the ex-Ottoman space means being a Muslim or vice versa.
Here it is needed to note that there are some permeabilities between the liberal and
Islamic identities. The events that resulted the rise of neo-Ottomanism are the results
of the accentuation of liberalism in Turkey. Furthermore, some liberal writers such as
Cengiz Çandar is publicly known as the adcocates of the neo-Ottoman foreign policy
vision (Yavuz, 1998).
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CHAPTER 3:
TURKEY’S EURASIAN OPTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA
In this chapter, I will examine the Eurasian option in Turkish foreign policy in the
post-Cold War era. Since it has been examined the historical and institutional bases
of the Turkish identity from the previous chapter, and since the countries of the
Eurasian region were under the dominance of the Former Soviet Union throughout
the Cold War era, I will begin my analysis by reviewing the Turkish foreign policy
towards Eurasia in the post-Cold war era. Then I will examine the discourses and
debates among influential social groups in the formation of the state preferences and
construction of national interests in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Eurasia.
1. The Review of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Eurasia in the Post-Cold War
Era
By the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the emergence of newly independent states
with which Turkey has historical and cultural affinities in Central Asia offered
Turkey a new sphere of influence. Especially, the nationalist segments of the Turkish
society has seen this option as a new opening opportunity for the Turkish foreign
policy. As Sezer (1992: 26) anticipated in the early 1990s “the welfare and security
of Turkish minorities in neighboring countries [has been] included in Turkey’s
foreign policy agenda.” A sense of nationalism and ethnic affinity has also been
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added to the realpolitik nature of Turkish foreign policy. By the collapse of Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, “Turkey’s influence might be extended to a loosely fashioned
‘Empire’” (Tunander, 1995: 415). Turkey, as in the era of the Ottoman Empire, has
become the center of the Balkans, Caucasus and the Central Asia. It has conduced to
present itself as “the first among equals –economically, culturally, politically”
(Tunander, 1995: 415). The anticipations one scholar, (Sezer, 1992: 28), in the early
1990s has been confirmed in the last decade:
The gathering momentum of nationalistic undercurrents and trends
in the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and the Turkic republics in
Central Asia could, however, challenge Turkish moderation,
forcing it to take up the protection of Turkish minorities and the
promotion of Turkish nationalism in the adjoining regions as a
strategic goal. The combined impact of Turkey’s exclusion from
Europe and the West’s apparent enthusiasm for and support of
Kurdish nationalism would only speed up and reinforce this
process.
The assertion, here, is not that nationalism has been the primary rationale of Turkish
foreign policy in the 1990s; however, it is needed to emphasize that nationalism has
been an important determinant of Turkish foreign policy in this era. The new
configuration of the geopolitics by the end of the Cold War, the deterioration of
Turkey’s relations with the European Union, and the internationalization of the
Kurdish issue after the Gulf War of 1991 can be assumed as the main reasons for the
rise of nationalist sentiment.
This sentiment has been visible until the Helsinki Summit of the European Union,
when Turkey has been given a candidate statute to the European Union. Although
Turkish foreign policy has been Western oriented throughout the Republican history,
the dynamics of the post-Cold War incited Turkey to diversify its loyalties from
Europe and to remember the ethnic affinities between Turkish speaking countries.
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This was one way or another coincided with the rise of nationalism in the domestic
politics of Turkey. Besides this nationalistic background, the new opportunities also
pushed Turkey within the terms of geopolitics while European Union was
emphasizing the deepening European identity on the liberal values of
democratization and human rights. These differentiating perspectives also deepened
the tension in the relations with Europe. Let examine the geopolitical opportunities
that Turkey has found itself by the demise of the bipolar world system.
The end of the Cold War led to fundamental changes for Turkey: new influence in
Central Asia and the Black Sea Region. The independence of the former Soviet
Republics has created new energy potentials for Turkey. The rich energy resources of
these Republics attracted Turkey. Besides these resources, the transition of them to
the West also created new opportunities to Turkey. The prominent energy pipeline
routes on the agenda are Turkmenistan-Turkey pipeline and the Baku-Ceyhan oil
pipeline. Besides these an alternative pipeline is the “Blue Stream” project, by which
it is aimed to transport natural gas to Turkey underneath the Black Sea. Turkey hopes
a great economic profit from these projects. However, these energy projects also
resurfaced the old historical rivalry between Russia and Turkey in the geopolitical
and economic realms (Larrabee, 2000: 26).11 The Chechens issue has been another
issue of conflict between Turkey and Russia in 1990s. Despite there existed a
considerable amount of Chechen oriented citizens in Turkey, official Turkish policy
toward Chechnya has been cautious due to its own problems with Kurdish separatism
(Larrabee, 2000: 24). In the end of the 1990s, during Prime Minister Ecevit’s
Moscow visit in November 1999, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement on this
                                                
11 For an elaborate evaluation of the relations between Turkey and Russia in the post-Cold War era
see: Sezer, 2000.
63
issue. By this agreement both sides has agreed not to support the terrorist activities
reciprocally (Sezer, 2000: 66).
By the increase of ties with the Eurasian Turkic countries, Turkey opened cultural
centers and schools in most of the Central Asian countries and provided training and
technical assistance for thousands of Central Asian students. Ankara also expanded
its television broadcasting to extend its cultural influence in Central Asia (Larrabee,
2000: 27). At those times, it was seen a tendency that an intensive cooperation with
these states can also be an important alternative to the European integration,
especially in the nationalist circles in Turkey. The Economist stated this as “Turkey's
meeting with the East after 70 years of Europeanization project” (quoted in Yeşilada,
1992: 46). This was not publicly exposed by the Turkish state, however, above-
mentioned tendency combined with the trend of Europe to expand towards the
Eastern Europe, where the former autocratic states were shifting to the democracies,
created new difficulties in Turkey’s relations with Europe. Turkey’s effort to expand
its ties in Central Asia has met with mixed results.
Larrabee (2000: 27-28) enumerates the reasons for Turkey’s spotty record. Firstly,
Turkey has overemphasized the linguistic and cultural affinities with the Central
Asian countries. Secondly, the domestic problems such as the growth of Kurdish
separatism and the challenge posed by the rise of Islamic forces in Turkish politics
have diverted Turkey’s attention from the region. Thirdly, Turkey’s threat
perceptions from the different countries other than the Eurasian region have also
diverted Turkey’s attention from Central Asia and Caucasus. Turkey’s threat
perceptions in the 1990s were basically from Syria and Iraq, instability in the
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Balkans; and the deterioration of relations with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean.
Fourthly, the economic scarcity and financial problems in Turkey during 1990s
prevented Turkey to provide the type of large-scale economic assistance and
investment that the states in the region need and want. Fifthly, the considerations of
Pan-Turkis groups in Turkey who prentended  to become the leader in Central Asia
and the Caucasus offended some Central Asian governments, who have just
emancipated from the Soviet rule.
Thus, as the time being, it was becoming clear that at least in the short run “Central
Asia’s systemic dependence on Russia was more powerful than its ethnic or organic
ties to Turkey” (Tunander, 1995: 414). Hence, Turkey began to use its affiliation
with newly independent states as its advantage in the framework of European
relations. This policy change can be seen in the expressions of Turkish foreign
minister İsmail Cem (1999):
…the post cold-war political framework witnessed the appearance
or the confirmation of several independent states. Out of the
multitude of those “new” states, almost all –in the Balkans, in the
Caucasus or in Central Asia- are those with whom Turkey shares a
common history or a common language and cultural affinity. This
provides Turkey with a new international environment of historical,
political and economic dimensions. Turkey thus becomes a
“center” for the emerging Eurasian reality and constitutes Western
Europe’s major historical, cultural and economic opening to
Eastern horizons.
These newly independent Central Asian countries attracted the attention of the
international society due to its natural resources. Some analysts argue that the
Caspian Sea Basin includes 3 percent of oil and 7 percent of natural gas resources of
the world (Partridge, 2000). The transition of those resources to the world markets
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brought Turkey into a significant position. Although Turkey has not rich energy
resources it occupies an important position with its geographical proximity to both
Caspian Sea Basin and the Persian Gulf Region. The dilemma here in European
relations is that USA is the forerunning state that uses the strategic and geographic
advantages of Turkey in an effective way. The Persian Gulf region and the Caspian
Basin are in the strategic calculations of America more than of Europe. On the other
hand the Europe sees Mediterranean Region importantly than USA in strategic terms
(Holmes, 2000). In such a strategic context, EU has doubts to accept a USA led
Turkey to the Union not to be used for American interests by means of Turkey. This
also plays a critical role for the accentuation of Turkey’s option for the strategic
partnership with the United States.
In addition to the constraints in the Central Asia, there are also limits in the Caucasus
for the execution of the Eurasian option for the Turkish policy makers. Turkey’s poor
relations with Armenia due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Armenian
allegations of Ottoman massacre during the First World War pose an obstacle to an
expansion of Turkey’s influence in the Caucasus. Furthermore, Russia’s political
ambitions and military presence in Armenia and in Georgia constraints Turkey’s
ability to expand towards the region (Larrabee, 2000: 29). Additionally, the
ambivalence of Azerbaijan’s political future is another constraint towards a
comprehensive Turkish influence in Caucasus.
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2. Foreign Policy Discourses and Debates among Diverse Social Identities in the
Formation of State Preferences and the Construction of National Interests
Given the the review of Turkish foreign policy towards Eurasia in the post-Cold War
era, let us examine the considerations of the social group identities on the policies
towards Eurasia. This will enable us analytical instruments to conceive the role of
identity on the formation of state preferences (according to liberal IR theory) and the
construction of state interests (according to constructivist IR theory). As in the
previous chapter, I will try to the approaches of social identities other than
Kemalism, which are the most influentail in Turkey’s relations with Eurasia, namely,
liberal, nationalist, and Islamic identities.
2. 1. Liberal Groups
As explored in the previous chapter, the European option is the main preference of
liberal groups in Turkey. They approach relations with the Eurasian countries as
instrumental to accentuate Turkey’s relations with Europe (Çandar and Fuller, 2001).
Accordingly, Turkey should utilize its priority among the newly emerged Turkish
Republic as a card to be preferred by the European Union. Furthermore, Turkey
should contribute to the consolidation of democratic premises in these countries; and
this is only possible by the realization of European option, especially in the existence
of the strong authoritarian tradition in Turkey.
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As known, one of the main premises of liberal IR theory is that the material scarcity
in foreign and security environment around a state constraints the success of
cooperation and increases the potential of conflict. In this vein, utilizing Turkey’s
ethnic affliation with the Eurasian states and Turkey’s Western orientation to have
great shares in the trasfer of material resources of the Eurasia to Europe accounts
much in the liberal conception. Accordingly, Turkey would be the more
advantageous state of the region in the distribution of the materials. Liberals argue
that distancing Turkey from Europe to Eurasia means distancing from democratic
consolidation in the country, also accounts in the liberal IR theory. Because in the
existence of Iranian and Russian identities in Eurasia, a Turkey, distanced from
Europe will shift to the authoritarian tradition to compete with the preferences of
these states.
The idea that Turkey would contribute to the democratic consolidation in the
Eurasian states can best be examined within the context of constructivist IR theory.
Accordingly, the interaction of systemic influences with the domestic dynamics
would result in identity changes and these changes, in turn, would affect the foreign
policy behaviors and the patterns of interaction. In this vein, the influence of Turkey
on the democratic consolidation in these states would improve their systemic ties
with Europe, which will contribute to the accentuation of the democratic discourse in
the domestic and international realms. Thus, when it is considered the influence of
international trends on the formation of domestic identities and the national interests,
the constructivist IR theory becomes important. Here, the liberal RI theory also
sufficient to explain this interaction. Because the interdepence between the
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international actors constraints the behaviors of the Eurasion countries to implement
the democratic implementations.
2. 2. Extreme Nationalist Groups
The nationalist impulse seen in 1990s can be observed in Turkey’s relations with the
Eurasian states. The reasons of the rise of nationalism in Turkey -the new
configuration of the geopolitics by the end of the Cold War, the deterioration of
Turkey’s relations with the European Union, and the internationalization of the
Kurdish issue after the Gulf War of 1991- led Turkey to move its relations with these
countries. As a result, centuries-old direction of Turkey’s Western-orientation has
become under scrutiny. The analysis of liberal IR theory in the previous chapter for
Europe is also valid for Eurasia. Accordingly, Europe’s emphasis on the human
rights record and Kurdish issue in Turkey has been attributed as the main indicator of
these conflicting identities. According to the nationalists it is impossible to be
integrated with Europe in the existence of underlying differences between Turkey
and Europe. Thus, Eurasia should be the alternative, where the nationalist groups
assume the identities as converging in terms of history, ethnic origin and cultural
similarities.
To evaluate the role of nationalism in the constructivist framework, we can claim
that the rise of nationalism in Turkey, interrelated with the Europe’s foreign policy
behaviors to exclude Turkey from the European processes in 1990s have resulted in
the deterioration of Turkey-European Union relations and the accentuation of the
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Eurasian option. This interaction has created the norms of the structure in Turkey’s
relations with Europe and Eurasia. For instance, by the changing patterns of the
norms, Turkey began to use its advantage in Europe’s relations with the Eurasian
countries.
2. 3. Islamic Groups
As I have stated with reference to its process in the previous chapter, in the recent
years the Islamic groups have increased their power to influence the formation of
state preferences and construction of the national interests. Islam, as a detrimental
social force for secularism, situated itself against the European option from the very
beginning. Although, the recent years, especially after the withdrawal of Erbakan
government after 1997, they seem to support Turkey’s European membership bid,
this is perceived by several circles as a tactical shift. Thus, with the coming of the
new geopolitical opportunities after the end of the Cold War, the Islamists in Turkey
strongly supported the Eurasian option, especially under the custodianship of neo-
Ottomanism (Yavuz, 1998). However, in the conception of the Islamists, Eurasia was
defined as to contain the Islamic world as well.
As I have summarized the features of the neo-Ottomanism in the previous chapter, the
social transformation of the Islamists by the liberal political and economic discourses
in Turkey, combined with the fundamental international developments by the end of
the Cold War (Yavuz, 1998) resulted in the change of conventional identities in
Turkish society. A group so called neo-Ottomans has searched for new alternatives
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rather than Europe. The Eurasia and the Islamic world have been perceived as the
major alternatives. The interaction of domestic and international dynamics that
resulted in this change can be explained by the constructivist terms, according to
which the intersubjective interactions between agent and structure are the determining
forces for the nature of the international relations. The emphasis of the Islamists on
the underlying identity differences between Islam and European civilization, which is
an outgrowth of Christianity, as an excuse not to politically integrate with Europe can
be explained by the liberal IR theory, according to which the underlying differences
of divergent identities between a state and its environment increase the potentials of
conflict and decrease the potentials of cooperation.
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CONCLUSION
In this study, I have tried to figure out the place of identity in the Turkish foreign
policy options in the post-Cold War era. Throughout the study, liberal IR theory and
constructivist IR theory, as two underlying approaches that attach importance to
identity have been utilized for the analyses of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold
War era. In so doing, I approached the premises of these theories comparatively. In
this context, I have firstly explored the concept of identity and its relationship to
foreign policy. Then I tried to draw conclusions from the main assumptions of liberal
and constructivist theories concerning possible courses on the direction of Turkish
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, and the role of identity in those courses.
Finally, I have analyzed Turkey’s foreign policy options, namely European and
Eurasian, with special respect to the main premises of these theories (liberal and
constructivist approaches). From this study, it can be drawn upon the following
conclusions:
1. Both liberal IR theory and constructivist IR theory acknowledge the place of
identity in the formulations of foreign policy decisions. While, liberal theory accepts
the competition among the social identities as the inputs of the state preferences,
which are assumed as the main constraints of foreign policy behaviors, the
constructivist theory approaches identity as both input and output for the construction
of national interests and the formation of foreign policies. Accordingly, while liberal
theory conceives identity in an “inside-out” approach, constructivist theory conceives
it in a “structuration” approach, according to which agents and structures mutually
constitute identities, interests and foreign policies.
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2. Considering the identity changes in Turkey and their impact on foreign policy
making processes, constructivism presents a more concrete model rather than the
liberal theory to explain them, because all social group identities are shaped by the
mutual constitution of the domestic and international dynamics. For instance,
concerning the post-Cold War Turkey, it is impossible to delineate the neoliberal
globalization in the world and liberalism in Turkey; the establishment of new nation-
states in the post-Cold War era in the world and nationalism in Turkey; the
acknowledgement of the minority rights in Europe and Kurdish nationalism in
Turkey; and Islamic fundamentalism in the world and Islamic movements in Turkey.
Liberal theory, by means of its assumption that the configuration of the state
preferences constraint the preferences of individual state, can partially explain the
interactions between global and domestic trends. However, contrary to
constructivism, it fails to develop a model by which the domestic and global trends
would influence the construction of the international affairs mutually, without any
prioritization of one to the other.
3. In the 1990s, the social identities in addition to Kemalism, the dominant state
ideology, have impacts upon the formulation of foreign policy decisions in Turkey.
However, their impact is constrained by the premises of Kemalism. In other words,
their capability is reduced only to qualify Kemalism to bring it close to their
ideology, but not impairing or destroying Kemalism. This is meaningful in the liberal
conception of IR, according to which the dominant state identity has the more
initiative to determine the state preferences. However, when it is investigated the
reasons of the dominance of Kemalism, then it will be seen that constructivism will
73
bring the concrete explanation for this in the sense that constructivism claims that the
identities, interests and foreign policies emerge in the historical, institutional and
social contexts. Accordingly, Kemalism, for approximately 80 years colored the
social, historical and institutional structures of the state. And for this reason it is very
difficult to impair this legacy. One can challenge to this view by claiming that the
other identities have also a long-awaited legacies. Yes, but in the institutional terms,
they are not as strong as Kemalism. The bureaucracy and military, which are
influential in formulating Turkey’s foreign and security policies, have a strong
Kemalist identity. Keeping this in mind, it can be argued that Kemalism as the
dominant state ideology will continue to be the most influential state identity in the
following years. In the direction of this, Turkey’s European option has more
probability to be realized than the Eurasian one due to the decades-old
“modernization” ethos of the Kemalist elite.
4. The idea that the underlying differences between the Turkish and European
identities would slow down the cooperation and integration between Turkey and
Europe is meaningful in the liberal IR conception, according to which in the
existence of divergent fundamental beliefs among the competing domestic and/or
transnational identities, then the conflict is more likely to happen rather than the
cooperation. This is true to a some extent. However, by having an “inside-out”
approach, liberal IR theory assumes the eternality of the diverging situation of the
identities, and left no place for the possibility of  cooperation in the future by means
of closing the diverging identities towards each other. Contrarily, since constructivist
theory proposes the mutual constitution of domestic and international system, it is
more likely to accept the identity changes than liberalism. Thus, the possibility of
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decreasing the identity differences to build up a well-functioning cooperation is more
likely to happen under the premises of constructivism.
5. Since Turkey’s foreign policy options, namely European and Eurasian, are not
deadlocked; i.e. since there is not a zero-sum game situation between these options,
in the terms of liberal IR theory (which proposes that if the preferences of different
international actors are not conditional to each other, then negotiation rather than
conflict or cooperation is more likely to happen), there are middle ways between
Europe and Eurasia for Turkey. For instance, Turkey’s possible full membership to
the European Union does not mean that Turkey would give up to develop relations
with the Eurasian states. In such a situation, Turkey would intensify its relations in
different realms within the borders of its responsibilities in the European Union.
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